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It's a Pirate's Life for Some:
The Development of an Illegal Industry in
Response to an Unjust Global Power Dynamic
ELLIOT A. ANDERSON*
ABSTRACT
This Note discusses the domestic and international economic effects
of the recent surge of piracy off the coast of Somalia, and uses Somali
piracy as a method of exploring conflicting ideological conditions that
arise from globalization. In exploring the underlying motivations for this
trend, it identifies a dichotomy between primary needs satisfaction
within underdeveloped nations and the satisfaction of secondary
interests in developed nations, and explains how globalization may be
exacerbating the turn toward piracy. This Note first discusses the recent
rise in piracy and then explores how the contemporary history of Somalia
has engendered the upsurge. Next, it considers how piracy has influenced
the economy of coastal Somalia, followed by a look at the ideological
intersection between primary domestic interests and secondary global
interests. Finally, this Note explores some of the international
implications of the rise of piracy in Africa, and whether further
expansion is a possibility.
INTRODUCTION
Whether a surge in an illicit domestic industry represents a turn in
the international power structure that is engendered by globalization is
a formidable question. One issue that may arise in an international
conflict is the ideological polarization between developed and
underdeveloped nations that stems from the desire for basic needs
satisfaction. As nations either develop, or remain developmentally
stagnant, those who reside within them have interests tied to-among
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other things-fulfilling their particular basic needs such as food and
shelter. In nations in which people are better able to satisfy their basic
needs, individuals may identify secondary interests, such as industry
and trade, the pursuance of which may conflict with the enduring
concerns of those in lesser developed nations whose goal remains
limited to receiving what they need to survive.
This clash between those satisfying their society's secondary
interests and those simply trying to survive by fulfilling their basic
needs can polarize an international community whose members pursue
self-serving ends through almost any means. Developmentally
challenged nations that find themselves in this situation run the risk of
falling prey to their more self-sufficient and accomplished international
neighbors. For the sake of self-preservation, citizens in the weaker
nation will sometimes act out of desperation, resorting to illegal
activities to obtain basic necessities while disregarding the
international response to their actions.
Domestic degradation is not always the result of mere internal
political or economic strife, nor social dissatisfaction. Maritime piracy
off the coast of Somalia is evidence that a combination of domestic
factors coupled with the negligence of the international community can
actually exacerbate domestic incapability to the extent that it becomes
an international criminal incident with serious global significance.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
defines piracy as "any illegal acts of violence or detention or any act of
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers
of a private ship," and is limited to the high seas and places "outside the
jurisdiction of any State."' Because piracy is considered to be a violation
of the law of nations, any nation's public vessel has the authority to
seize a pirate ship and try those responsible for the crime.2 This thriving
but illegal industry implicates both domestic and international efforts at
national building. The rise of piracy exhibits the importance of the
international effort to assist in nation building and therefore to help
create domestic stability, so as to avoid such industries taking hold in
underdeveloped regions. Maritime piracy represents a real danger that
nations face through increasing globalization. The purpose of this Note
is to discuss how piracy can be a reflective microcosm of the exploitation
of an unfair global power dynamic that helps encourage criminal
behavior through a failure to self-regulate from a legal perspective.
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
2. Id. art. 105.
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Over the last decade, the number of maritime piracy attacks has
increased steadily, and more recently, that number has skyrocketed.
During 2008, a worldwide total of 293 reported incidents of piracy
occurred against ships, an increase of eleven percent from 2007. 4 In
2009, 406 incidents were reported, marking the third successive year
this number has increased and the largest percent increase on record.'
Incidents of piracy include attacks, robberies, and hijacks on vessels
that are either out at sea or in port.6 Prior to 1992, statistics that
suggested trends in attack frequency were difficult to accumulate
because no standard method for incident reporting was in place.7 But, in
1992, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), one of the
International Chamber of Commerce's Commercial Crime Services,
established the Piracy Reporting Centre, which enabled shipmasters to
report actual or attempted attacks against vessels! The development of
this system helped to raise awareness of areas that were particularly
risky to the shipping industry.9 Recently, a glance at the IMB's live
piracy map displays a very clear area of exceptionally high risk to the
industry.'0
The region on the eastern coast of Africa, home to Somalia, is known
as the Horn of Africa. Somalia runs east along the Gulf of Aden, where
four percent of the world's oil is moved each day, and then southward
along the coast, jutting out into the Indian Ocean in a domestic region
known as Puntland. Finally, its border falls south past the war-torn
lands surrounding the latent capital Mogadishu.1 Somalia is a country
known for both its bitter internal struggle between moderates and
3. Int'l Chamber of Commerce, Commercial Crime Services, IMB Reports
Unprecedented Rise in Maritime Hijackings, Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.iccccs.org/index.
php?option=com content&view=-article&id=332:imb-reports-unprecedented-rise-in-
maritime-hijackings&catid=60:news&Itemid=51 [hereinafter CCS IMB].
4. Id.
5. Int'l Chamber of Commerce, Commercial Crime Services, 2009 Worldwide Piracy
Figures Surpass 400, Jan. 14, 2010, http://www.iccccs.org/index.php?option=com-content&
view-article&id=385:2009-worldwide-piracy-figures-surpass400&catid=60:news&
Itemid=51 [hereinafter CCS 2009 Report].
6. CCS IMB, supra note 3.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Int'l Chamber of Commerce, Commercial Crime Services, IMB Live Piracy Map
2009, http://www.iccccs.org/index.php?option=com-fabrik&view-visualization&controller=
visualization.googlemap&Itemid=219 (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
11. See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2009), available at
https://www.cia.govllibrary/publicationsthe-world-factbookgeosso.html (last visited Feb.
18, 2010) [hereinafter CIA WORLD FACTBOOK]; Ellen Knickmeyer, 100 Hostages Held by
Somali Pirates, WASH. POST, Sep. 12, 2008, at All.
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extremists and its lack of external validity. Somalia's failure on the
international stage results from the country's inability to maintain
neither an operative central government since 1991, nor a central bank,
meaning there is no functioning economy.12 Inflation is impossible to
calculate because businesses print money, and there are vast disparities
in regional economies.13 According to recent estimates, the life
expectancy rate for Somalis is under fifty years, and the gross domestic
product per capita sits around US$600. 14
Statistics such as these are important for understanding the
motivations of those committing the attacks identified by the IMB. In
working to recognize the consequences of piracy and the industry's
influence on both the domestic and global economies, it is necessary to
first examine the political and economic status of the country
contributing to piracy. As with most international or domestic
developments, a proper understanding of the potential catalysts of a
particular situation allows one to understand the logical implications
that may result. In other words, a meta-analysis of recent events that
prove this trend in maritime piracy may create a method for forecasting
future events and for determining options that may potentially curb this
growing, illicit industry.
Part One of this Note will examine the contemporary trends in
maritime piracy. Part Two will discuss an analysis of the political and
economic factors that may contribute to these trends. Part Three moves
further into a conversation about the motivations for piracy based on
international pressure, an unbalanced power structure, and
unaccommodating maritime law. Part Four finishes with a look into the
global implications and foreseeable difficulties the world may be facing,
largely as a result of international irresponsibility.
I. CONTEMPORARY TRENDS IN MARITIME PIRACY
As previously noted, 2009 marked the contemporary pinnacle in
maritime piracy. The figures for 2009 are higher than all other figures
for hijacked vessels since the inception of the IMB Piracy Reporting
Centre. 5 Of the 406 reported incidents of piracy against ships, 153
vessels were boarded, forty-nine were hijacked, and 120 were fired
upon, compared to only forty-six fired upon in 2008.16 The significance of
this increase is that it suggests pirates have greater access to weapons,
12. See CIA WoRLD FACTBOOK, supra note 11.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See CCS 2009 Report, supra note 5.
16. Id.; CCS IMB, supra note 3.
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enabling more violent attacks.
The considerable growth in the attacks reported by the IMB is
attributable to the Gulf of Aden region, where in 2009, 217 attacks were
reported either within the Gulf or off the coast of Somalia, compared to
111 in 2008.'7 In 2008, Nigeria ranked second, with forty attacks
reported, and the IMB estimates that there are approximately one
hundred more unconfirmed incidents that have occurred in the area,
where under-reporting remains a major concern.18 This trend continued
in Nigeria during 2009, with twenty-eight confirmed attacks and
another thirty estimated unreported.' 9 These drastic increases around
Africa have come at a time when other areas already known for
incidents of piracy have experienced significant declines. 20 For example,
Indonesia reported only twenty-eight incidents in 2008, down from 121
in 2003, and within the Malacca Straits the number was also reduced.2 '
These trends reflect the international character of maritime piracy.
Piracy in Southeast Asia has seen a steady decline since the increased
involvement of more developed nations such as Japan and China, which
assumed more active roles in order to protect their international
industries.22 Such involvement, combined with the increased number of
attacks in areas lacking a strong central government betrays a now
obvious feature of the pirating industry. It can subsist in regions where
there is populist support and lack of a sound governmental foundation.
However, this analysis makes combating piracy sound deceptively
simple and fails to acknowledge the realities of international diplomacy.
II. PIRACY IN SOMALIA
Piracy is the fastest growing industry in Somalia and is projected to
have replaced agriculture and fishing as the country's largest generator
of revenue.23 Of course, identifying it as such is misrepresenting the
truth in a country that maintains no central bank and that deals in
corruption.24 To suggest that piracy is in fact an industry, as it is labeled
17. CCS 2009 Report, supra note 5; CCS IMB, supra note 3.
18. CCS IMB, supra note 3.
19. CCS 2009 Report, supra note 5.
20. CCS !MB, supra note 3.
21. Id.
22. Ian Barclay, Private Sector Helps to Ease Piracy Fears in Malacca Strait: But State
Help Is Still Crucial in the Waters, LLOYD'S LIST, July 4, 2006, at 4.
23. David Axe, No Quick Solutions to Pirate Crisis, WORLD POL. REV., Oct. 6, 2008,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=2744.
24. Mohamed Olad Hassan & Elizabeth Kennedy, Pirates' Ransom Helping Somalian
Towns Boom, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, available at http://seattletimes.
nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2008413082-pirateboom 2O.html.
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in both this Note and in other documents, ignores the fact that a
country must first be industrial in order to have identifiable primary
and secondary industries. Ignoring this obvious nominal defect, piracy
may be seen as an industry because it has the potential to accomplish
what most legal industries in countries with robust economies can-it
provides goods and services for people who, in this particular case, have
severely limited access to them. In order to better understand this idea,
it is necessary to first discuss recent economic and political trends in
Somalia, followed by an examination of how these two sectors have
worked in conjunction to encourage piracy in the region.
A. Political Destabilization and Stagnation
In 1991 the authoritarian socialist regime that had governed
Somalia since a coup in 1969 collapsed.25 In May of that same year,
northern clans formed what they declared to be an independent
Republic of Somaliland, which has not been formally recognized by any
government.26 Following suit, three regions in the northeast formed the
self-governing and self-declared autonomous state of Puntland in 1998.27
Within Puntland are the cities Boosaaso and Eyl, both known for their
links with Somali piracy.28 In 1993, the United Nations (U.N.) began a
two-year humanitarian effort to alleviate famine, targeting the south
where the Somali capital Mogadishu is located. But by the time the
U.N. withdrew in 1995, order had not yet been restored, and the U.N.
had suffered significant casualties.
29
More recently, in 2004 an interim government known as the
Somalia Transitional Federal Institution (TFI) was created in the
south.3 ° In 2006, the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC), a group of Islamic
court militias, took control of Mogadishu.3 1 The CIC then continued its
military expansion through the south and threatened to overthrow the
Transitional Federal Government, located west of the capitol in
Baidoa.32 Yet in December 2006, Ethiopian forces assisting TFI moved
into the region and intervened, resulting in the collapse of the CIC.
33
However, steady resistance from Islamic extremist groups has
25. CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 11.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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continued throughout the country, leading to political stagnation.3 4
The political situation in Somalia has led to an ideological
divergence among those in charge about the status of the nation's
government. As Islamic insurgents drew closer to the nation's capital,
the now-former president of the transition government, Abdullahi Yusuf
Ahmad, stated that the government could collapse.35 Prime Minister
Nur Hassan Hussein did not share the same view in late 2008 when he
stated that the government was moving toward stabilizing the country
with the help of the U.N. and Ethiopian forces.36 However, on January
31, 2009, Moderate Islamist leader Sheikh Sharif Sheekh Ahmed
became the new President of Somalia, only days after Ethiopian troops
withdrew from Somalia and rebel forces launched an attack on the
parliament building and presidential palace in Baidoa, leaving only the
presidential palace in Mogadishu under government control.37 The
Somali Civil War has continued throughout the south of the country
during 2009.
This political dysfunction, running for nearly two decades, has
coincided with instability in the nation's economy, which may only be
characterized as informal at best. Most recently, Ahmedou Ould-
Abdallah, the Secretary-General's Special Representative, stated that
"the crisis in Somalia [is] no longer local or even regional, but a global
one that could no longer be ignored." 38
B. Economic Informality and Degradation
The United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports that
"[d]espite the lack of effective national governance, Somalia has
maintained a healthy informal economy, largely based on livestock,
remittance/money transfer companies, and telecommunications. 3 9 In
fact, this statement denies the degree of the economic hardship in
Somalia, one of the United Nations fifty 'least developed countries."'
Agriculture is identified as the most important sector in Somalia, and
34. Id.
35. Edmund Sanders, The President Is to Blame for Somalia's Woes, Premier Says,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2008, at 4.
36. Id.
37. CNN.com, New Somali President Sworn in Amid Upheaval (Jan. 31, 2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/01/31/somalia.election.president/index.html.
38. Press Release, Security Council, Secretary-General's Special Representative,
Briefing Security Council, Calls Somalia 'Global Crisis' That Can No Longer Be Ignored,
U.N. Doc. SC19844 (Jan. 14, 2010).
39. CIA WORLD FAcTBOOK, supra note 11.
40. U.N. Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries:
Somalia, http://www.unohrlls.org/en/orphanl136/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
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the U.N. has concluded that economic life has continued in the nation
during two decades of political chaos because much of the economic
activity in Somalia is local and can therefore be protected.4 ' Livestock is
the primary export in Somalia, but a recent ban by Saudi Arabia on
Somali livestock has caused a severe decline in the industry.42 Also,
Somalia's industrial sector has reportedly been looted and sold for scrap
metal according to both the U.N. and CIA.43
The claim that Somalia has maintained a healthy informal economy
could not be further from the truth. UNICEF reports the average
annual growth rate of GDP per capita between 1970 and 1990 to be
-0.9%.4 The statistic is unavailable after 1990 because there is no
longer an appropriate method to obtain this type of data.45 For 2008, the
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
reported a total of almost $616 million committed or contributed to help
the Somali economic crisis and another $70 million pledged.46 In 2009,
almost $622 million was committed or contributed with another $40.5
million pledged.47
C. Politics and the Economy: The Effect on the Fishing Industry of
Coastal Somalia
The combination of a failed internal economy and lack of an
adequate governance structure has had a unique effect on one
particular sector of the nation's coastal economy. The domestic fishing
industry has declined over much of the last two decades, and this may
have directly contributed to the rise in piracy off the coast of Somalia.48
In 1994, only three years after the collapse of the Somali
government, UNCLOS entered into force, thereby creating a zone for
coastal nations to possess the exclusive rights to the natural resources
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. UNICEF, Somalia Statistics, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/somalia.
statistics.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
45. Id.
46. ReliefWeb, Appeals & Funding, http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/pageloader.aspx?page=
searchreporting-display&CQ=cq02O20900162OhQxNcuXsbg&orderby-USD-pledg&show
Details= (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
47. ReliefWeb, Appeals & Funding, Somalia: Funding Received 2009,
http://reliefweb.int/rw/fts.nsf/docl05?OpenForm&rc=l&cc=som&yr-2009 (last visited Feb.
18, 2010).
48. Jeffrey Gettleman, Pirates Tell Their Side: They Only Want Money, N. Y. TEMES,
Oct. 1, 2008, at A6.
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found therein.49 This adoption established a limited territory for
fishermen and confined them to their national waters.50 Confinement
created an increase in competition within these newly defined national
boundaries, resulting in stock depletion throughout Somalia's tuna-rich
waters.51 Yet stock depletion was not merely the direct result of
domestic over-fishing off coastal Somalia.
52
After the collapse of the domestic government, foreign ships moved
into the region and began to illegally fish in Somali territory.5 3 The
absence of a functional method for enforcement of maritime fishing law,
due to a non-functioning government and complete lack of naval force,
meant that fishing vessels from Europe and Asia were able to deplete
the nation's fisheries, which some Somalis believe to be the reason for
poverty and social decay in their coastal towns.54  The U.N.
substantiated this claim in 2005 when it estimated that approximately
700 unlicensed foreign vessels were fishing in Somali waters. 5  As a
result, Somali fishermen were reportedly forced to take matters into
their own hands.56 They armed themselves and began to act as
vigilantes, confronting illegal commercial fleets, demanding they pay
taxes, and attempting to drive the vessels from their territory.57
If tuna stock depletion in Somalia is the result of negative foreign
influence, then it is necessary to point out the circular pattern into
which this power dynamic has now evolved. Some pirates claim that
they turned to hijacking as a method to impede foreign vessels trying to
destroy their fishing boats and equipment and to inhibit illegal fishing.
58
Now, according to recent statistics, it appears that the Indian Ocean
tuna industry has been hurt by the piracy it may have helped cause.
5 9
Tuna catches in the southwestern Indian Ocean fell as much as thirty
percent over 2008, and this suggests a real threat to an industry that is
worth over $6 billion. 60 This sharp decline has not been attributed
49. UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 55-56.
50. Sean Kane, Fishing for the Motives that Lie Behind Piracy; Attacks on Vessels Can
Often Be Attributed to Social Deprivation in Coastal Regions, LLOYD'S LIST, Mar. 5, 2008,
at 19.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Kane, supra note 50.
56. Gettleman, supra note 48.
57. Kane, supra note 50.
58. Gettleman, supra note 48.
59. See Richard Lough, Somali Pirates Threaten Indian Ocean Tuna Industry,
REUTERS, Jan. 22, 2009, http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNewslidAFJOE5OL09
S20090122.
60. Id.
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entirely to piracy on the Horn of Africa, but the head of the Indian
Ocean Tuna Commission believes that countries such as France and
Spain were forced to move their fleets farther east and therefore caught
only half of their total from August to November 2007.6l
Illegal international commercial fishing along the coast of Somalia
has resulted in stock depletion, which in turn forced local fishermen to
adapt to the economic crisis by utilizing other methods to either drive
out the competition or capitalize on their participation. In turn, this has
caused pressure on a healthy international industry that, in this case,
was the product of stronger nations capitalizing on the incapacity of
another.
As previously noted, this international dysfunction is a reflection of
the danger of globalization and the exploitation of an unfair
international power dynamic. Rather than protect industry and
domestic resources, the reality of UNCLOS is that its functionality is
dependent on the strength of the state it purports to protect. The
international community is failing to self-regulate by ignoring evidence
suggesting that its members are taking advantage of a collapsed state
that has no ability to enforce international law. Illegal commercial
fishing fleets are able to exploit the domestic natural resources of a
country without legal ramifications, forcing the local communities to
take matters into their own hands. Furthermore, the legal
irresponsibility of the international community has encouraged a
domestic population to resort to illicit means to satisfy basic needs, and
now the international community is essentially drowning in the very
waters it attempted to protect.
This does not mean that UNCLOS fails to account for illegal
activities of signatory states in a coastal state's exclusive economic
zones. Article 58 asserts that "states shall have due regard to the rights
and duties of the coastal state and shall comply with the laws and
regulations adopted by the coastal State."62 However, Article 220 then
discusses the enforcement of UNCLOS by coastal States, enabling these
States to exercise enforcement within their exclusive economic zone or
territorial waters.63 Yet this assumes that a coastal State has the ability
to police its own territory with a functional navy or coast guard. In other
words, in a situation where this is not a reality, as in Somalia, the State
is left to hope that the commercial industries of other States choose not
to illegally exploit available resources, although there are no legal or
political repercussions if they do. Thus far, the only repercussions are
the piracy attacks carried out by armed groups.
61. Id.
62. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 58.
63. Id. art. 220.
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As a result of the conflict, the U.N. adopted Security Council
Resolution 1851 to create potential solutions to this problem and right
the wreck, so to speak.6 Yet, from the outside looking in, it is hard to
reconcile this push for the use of potentially violent force as an
appropriate method to discourage any further exacerbation of an
already rather uncontrollable situation. Instead this may in fact force
the theoretical "balloon effect" that seems to be in play when applying
pressure to an illegal industry that results from unalterable poverty,
simply causing the same illegal industry to emerge elsewhere. In fact,
this may already be happening on the other side of the continent-an
idea that will be further explored in Part Four.
III. CAN'T GET NO (NEEDS) SATISFACTION:
CAN WE RIGHT THIS WRONG?
The facts and patterns identified thus far lead to a conversation
regarding a struggle for power resulting from alleged international
transgressions. Therefore, this conversation must also focus on the
question of whether a consequence of this struggle-piracy-is a
justifiable result. While the purpose of this Note is not to justify piracy,
viewing it from this alternate perspective identifies a difficult moral
conundrum, and evaluating it may actually assist in finding solutions to
diplomatically combat the recent plague of piracy. Although
determining whether piracy is justifiable may be an easy question to
answer from a legal-and in most cases moral-perspective because it
pits law-breaking pirates against those diligently defending the
industry and travel of the developed world, there is a different way of
viewing the issue that makes identifying an answer more complex. An
analysis of the conflict between the effort to satisfy basic needs in
underdeveloped nations and the pursuit of secondary interests by
developed nations, which maintain stronger positions of power on the
international stage, blurs the line between right and wrong for those
involved in piracy. In simpler terms, this conflict can be identified as
one of primary concerns, such as obtaining food, shelter, and clothing,
versus secondary concerns, such as promoting industrial development,
transportation, and international trade.
The reality of increasing globalization is that these two very
different interests exist alongside one another and in a much more
consistently intimate way than ever before. Developed and
underdeveloped nations are constantly in contact for a wide variety of
reasons. Some are legal, such as enforcement of human rights laws, and
64. S.C. Res. 1851, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008).
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others are non-legal, ranging from humanitarian aid to border warfare.
Applying the analysis to the case of maritime piracy around the
Horn of Africa portrays the polarization between developed and
underdeveloped nations that engenders the justification conversation.
On one side, an identifiable concern could be whether an individual will
be able to eat on any given day, and on the other, a concern may be the
destabilization of the global economy, exemplified in part by the
disruption of major oil shipments through the Gulf of Aden. Further
exploration of these issues requires a return to Somalia.
A. Reformation of the Somali Coastal Economy: The Pirate Side of Life
Along with the recent increase in pirate attacks comes a number of
articles portraying pirates in an exaggerated manner-a throwback to
the days of yellow journalism--emphasizing this "glamorous" return to
barbarism. However, among the embellished stories of those who report
on the talismanic identity of these "Robin Hood"-type pirates, there lies
a significant truth about the effect of piracy on the domestic economy of
Somalia. Piracy as an industry may actually be economically benefiting
the Somali people, and towns along the coast of Puntland are becoming
almost as newsworthy as the pirates who reside in them.
Harardhere, Boosaaso, and Eyl are villages that have benefited from
a pirate economy. 5 In Eyl, villagers report that more shops are opening,
including Internet cafes and telephone stores, and that business is
good.66 Business owners believe that pirates depend on them and that
they are benefiting from the businesses in town.67 When pirates hijack a
ship, it is then moved from deeper water to the coast so that the pirates
may resupply, which they come ashore to do almost daily.68 In some
cases, store owners even set up layaway plans for them, anticipating the
influx of money from ransom.69 Residents seem to care very little about
where the money comes from and whether it is obtained legally or
illegally, as long as it keeps food on the table.70 Even twenty-four-hour
electricity, once an unknown commodity in this part of the country, has
been made available where large houses and nice cars are becoming
increasingly visible.71 Yet others believe that Eyl may not be benefiting
and suggest that the money stays with the pirates, who merely use the
65. Hassan & Kennedy, supra note 24.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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town as a port before returning to their native villages.72
In Boosaaso a similar economic upturn has taken place, though it
has come at a price. The economy of the village has crashed, and
inflation has increased due to a lack of available work that is a result of
a decline in shipping traffic.73 Yet there is also new construction in the
city.74 A new section of town is developing called New Boosaaso.75 Here,
as in Eyl, houses are being constructed which cost several hundred
thousand dollars and have been linked to pirate money.
76
The statistics are suggestive and so are the accusations from coastal
residents. The United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia reported in
December 2008 that ransom payments were to exceed fifty million
dollars for that year and that the total budget for Puntland is only
approximately twenty percent of projected piracy revenue over the same
period.77 Members of the state government are accused of working with
pirates, including the former president of Puntland, whose nephew was
detained by Somaliland officials while carrying US$22,000 in cash.78
The allegations against members of the Puntland administration are
well substantiated according to the U.N. Monitoring Group, which
reported that several officials in Puntland were fired for involvement in
piracy, and that the mayor of Eyl previously alleged the complicity of
ministers and police officials in piracy.
79
The fluidity in the piracy industry is one of the primary factors
indicative of its potential to bolster the coastal economy. Pirates are
usually young men in their twenties who are illiterate, unable to find
work, and willing to die trying to earn money.80 However, many of these
men, upon involving themselves with one or two hijackings and
receiving cash payments for their services, are eager to retire.8 ' This
suggests that there is ample opportunity to become involved in piracy,
72. Shashank Bengali, Forget Depp: Somali Pirates Risk All for Riches, Women,
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and the numbers are reflective of this fact. The total number of pirates
estimated to be operating in the waters off Somalia's coast is now
between 1,000 and 1,500. Some fear the payment of ransom is only
encouraging more to join.82 The potential to earn US$1-2 million per
hijacked ship is hard to pass up for those who have nothing else to rely
on for income.83 It is believed that piracy contributes to the local
economy and, while it is evident that Somali piracy is driven by a
determination for needs satisfaction and has achieved relative success
in the process, the world perspective on piracy reflects a far different
reality.
B. Implications for a Global Society: The International Economic
Perspective on Piracy
Piracy has placed a stranglehold on the shipping industry
throughout the Gulf of Aden, and the global implications from the
recent surge are already visible. Throughout the Indian and Pacific
Oceans, it is estimated that piracy costs the shipping industry between
thirteen and fifteen billion dollars.8 Over the last year, insurance
premiums have spiked, rising from approximately $900 at the beginning
of 2008 to $12,000 by November 2008, with another sixty percent
increase estimated between November and December. The shipping
industry has been forced to adapt by finding other routes, thereby
greatly increasing costs due to, among other things, the need for
security.86 These increased costs take their economic toll on the
consumer when they are reflected in the final price of the shipped
goods. 7
Although each day more than three million barrels of oil pass
through the Gulf of Aden, accounting for four percent of the world's oil
transportation, the effects of piracy are not limited to this industry.
8
There are also serious humanitarian consequences that are influencing
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the international agenda, and also eroding Somalia domestically. 89
Nongovernmental organizations with the primary focus of delivering aid
to the more than 2.5 million people in need of food in Somalia are
having their efforts curbed by piracy.9° In December 2004 it was
reported that the U.N.'s World Food Programme was closing its
maritime supply lines due to piracy, significantly driving up the cost of
delivering food aid and causing food aid stocks to reach an all time low.9'
The lack of international access to many Somalis as a result of piracy
can be considered an international dilemma and another of the
secondary interests of the international community.
One does not have to look farther than Somalia's neighbor to the
south, Kenya, to substantiate this economic claim. In November 2008,
the Daily Nation, a Kenyan newspaper, released a report stating that
Somali piracy is an economic emergency that is strangling Kenya at a
time when there is already financial difficulty. 2 The Kenyan treasury
has already been depleted by security operations that seek to prevent
problems such as illegal arms transfers and illegal immigration into the
country.93 Piracy has complicated this problem because Kenya produces
much of its wealth using its maritime industry and there is great risk
that the transportation sector, which provides twelve percent of the
country's GDP, will be greatly diminished. 94
Other pressure on the regional economy comes from higher
insurance rates and higher shipping costs.95 Egypt also reported in
November 2008 that diverting shipments around the Cape of Good Hope
would only increase costs and slow down transport times.96 The
international implications are clear: Somali piracy has a direct effect on
industry both within the region and beyond, and the pirates' interest in
self-preservation is burdening the economic interests of the
international community.
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C. The Ideological Intersection Between Primary Domestic and
Secondary Global Interests
The purpose of the accumulation of this information is to suggest
that there is more to this story than the decimation of the Gulf of Aden's
shipping industry. The satisfaction of basic needs-the need to eat, the
need for electricity, or the need for some form of economic stabilization
that will fight back inflation and devaluation of goods and services-is
the driving force behind this criminal enterprise. Identifying this root
shows how international conflict may evolve where a practical, though
unlawful, solution to basic needs satisfaction intersects with the
secondary interests of the modernized world.
Admittedly, rationalizing future conformity to the rule of law for
individuals that are acting illegally seems ineffective in this situation
because there is nothing to bargain over if neither side is able to identify
an equally successful second option to satisfy basic needs. However, the
purpose of this Note is not to advocate the use of illegal tactics to satisfy
primary needs in an undeveloped nation, but rather to explore the
motivations behind the trend. There is no support to posit that an illegal
action chosen based on a clear lack of legal alternatives is justifiable.
Yet this consideration helps illuminate the fact that it is the
responsibility of the international community to realize that this is only
nominally-elective behavior, and to readjust this populist mentality
from the inside out, not from external pressure. In particularly dire
situations, motivation is arguably derived from the opportunity to
achieve some gain through whatever means may be necessary, and this
may include breaking the law, whether international or domestic. In
this case, there are few other means available, and they are both
unreliable and possibly less effective. Though the pirates may be
creating more internal strife by exacerbating their domestic problems,
they are also responding to those problems which currently exist.
The goal in portraying Somali coastal society as a benefactor of, and
beneficiary from, piracy is to depict this dichotomy as something that is
more than a disagreement over morality. Piracy is a domestic response
to an unfair power dynamic that has only recently played out in this
region to the detriment of the rest of the world. Its global economic
implications are forcing the international community to acknowledge
the existence of a problem that has been ignored for years. To this effect,
piracy may be actually encouraging international actions which, if
undertaken, could lead to the stabilization of the region. The core of the
problem is lack of access to items necessary for satisfying basic needs,
and the only way to derail the illicit industry that is fulfilling these
needs may be to replace it with a legal method that is more efficient and
ITS A PIRATES LIFE FOR SOME
effective than piracy.
The reality is that piracy is an unjustifiable response to a domestic
crisis. Rather than accomplishing the good some believe it does, the
domestic consequence is the empowerment of a dangerous and
desperate group of people who are only motivated by their own self
interests, not the primary needs of others. Perhaps money is not being
invested in proper domestic industries but rather reinvested in an illicit
one, or it is being sent abroad to expatriates or private financiers.
Surely, those who feel the global ripple of detrimental effects resulting
from the actions of these buccaneers are not necessarily the catalysts of
piracy. They do not encourage the radicalism and infighting that has
crippled the nation for nearly two decades. Primarily it is the Somalis
who cause their own domestic political strife and suffer the economic
consequences.
D. Eradicating Piracy Through Internal Efforts and Humanitarian Aid
Although the lack of domestic control of crime is well documented, it
appears that along with the increase in piracy there is also some
semblance of a negative domestic reaction to the industry by the Somali
people. Within communities where an influx of capital from piracy is
present, there are also grassroots militias forming to ward off pirates,
mainly because of the country's strict adherence to Islam.97 Puntland's
new President Abdirahman Mohamed Mohamud stated that "pirates
are spoiling our society" and that he intends to "crush them. ' 8 Indeed
some of Puntland's resident pirates have made clear that they are
willing to quit if they are able to find regular jobs and protection against
illegal fishing and dumping. 99 Further, it is reported that Puntland
officials have acknowledged that Somalia may ultimately benefit from
the increased exposure that piracy has brought to Somalia, as
previously posited in this Note.' °
Between 2008 and 2013, the European Commission and its Member
States have pledged more than £215 million in aid for the domestic
development of Somalia'' In 2009, the U.S. government provided more
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than $150 million for humanitarian assistance in Somalia. 10 2 These
numbers, in conjunction with reports by local government officials,
suggest that the piracy industry may be ready to implode at the hands
of domestic stabilization through the increased provision of
humanitarian aid rather than through the use of international force.
IV. EXPANSION OF PIRACY IN GLOBAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXTS
Although the economic implications of contemporary maritime
piracy were already explored in the context of identifying the ideological
conflict between primary domestic and secondary international
interests, the issue must be revisited, this time in order to discuss the
compositional quality of the industry and the specific regional influence
resulting from maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia.
A. The Structural Composition of Somali Piracy: From Financing to
Hijacking
There are two main networks of pirates operating off the coast of the
Horn of Africa, and despite reports suggesting otherwise, they are
loosely organized and poorly trained. 10 3 The first network is located in
Puntland, based mainly in the Eyl district, while the other is located in
Central Somalia. °4 To some extent, these two networks cooperate and
coordinate with one another, and the organizations are guided largely
by the principles of private enterprise. 0 5 The security sector in Puntland
is relatively weak, and there is simply no capacity for law enforcement
in Central Somalia. 106 Both private financiers and other prominent
business organizations advance the startup money for the pirate
groups.'0 7 Aside from cash, these funders also provide assistance in the
form of boats, fuel, arms, and communication equipment.10 8
The second phase of the piracy operation begins with the seizure of
a targeted vessel.'" Once a vessel is seized, it is the financier's job to
find a sponsor who is willing to bankroll the cost of the operation, which
102. USAID, OFFICE OF U.S. FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE, SOMALIA-COMPLEX
EMERGENCY (2010), http://www.usaid.gov/our.work/humanitarianassistance/disaster_
assistance/countries/somalia/template/fs_sr/fy20l0/somalia_ce_sr02_2-03-2009.pdf.
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will eventually be paid back through a share of the ransom."' ° The
vessel is then taken to a coastal port, an attribute for which the village
of Eyl has made its namesake. Once in port, a ground team awaiting the
arrival takes care of the supplies and pays for local protection of those
on board the vessel."' This indicates that there is some form of corrupt
political acquiescence in play, and the U.N. Monitoring Group reported
that senior government officials are among those involved.' 
2
After negotiations, a ransom is paid in cash to those who
successfully influence the foreign entity that owns the vessel."'
Distribution is flexibly scaled but is reported to resemble the following:
maritime militia, ten percent; ground militia, ten percent; local
community, ten percent; financier, twenty percent; sponsor, thirty
percent. 14 These numbers suggest that at least half of the total ransom
paid goes to those putting up the money to finance the operation, with
relatively low risk compared to the incredibly high reward that may be
obtained.
Somali piracy has also been linked to other criminal operations
within the region, suggesting that foreign financing may be a reality.
Arms and human trafficking have both been linked to piracy in the Gulf
of Aden and one group within Puntland allegedly uses the same boats
that it uses for piracy to move refugees and economic migrants between
Somalia and Yemen." 5 The allegations of international funding and
collaboration has brought increasing concern about the global reach of
piracy.
B. Regional and Global Expansion: The Niger Delta and Caribbean
Connection
One idea that has been shared in articles that are written on the
subject of combating maritime piracy is that the success of Somali
piracy may be contributing to its success elsewhere. Although this is not
the primary focus of this Note, it is an idea that is important for any
discussion on the topic. "The success of the pirates off Somalia is also a
key factor behind the rise in attacks elsewhere, in areas such as Nigeria
and South America."'" 6 Nowhere is this more evident than on the other
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side of the continent, within the Niger Delta region, where a lack of
essential facilities combines with government corruption and
resentment towards foreign companies.' 17 As previously mentioned,
Nigeria accounts for the second-most--Somalia is first-reported
incidents of piracy worldwide." 
8
Although piracy has surged in both countries at the same time, the
motivations behind the movements diverge. Unlike Somalis, Nigerian
pirates are believed to be politically, rather than financially,
motivated." 9 In fact, many of the attacks in Nigeria are legally
classified as acts of terrorism or assault instead of piracy.120 Hostage
taking also seems to be reserved for ideological purposes in Nigeria, and
is primarily limited to rebel groups acting against the oil industry. 12 In
Somalia, however, motives are not explicitly political and the lack of
ideological demands encourages ship owners to pay ransom with the
belief that payment will resolve the incident.
22
The rise in piracy in Nigeria has revealed rifts between the State's
pillars, including industry, local communities, and the government.
23
Although there is still a functioning government, as is evident in
Nigeria, this circumstance caters to the development of the maritime
piracy industry. In April 2008, it was reported that many fishermen
refused to work until the piracy threat diminished, which led to inflated
food prices and a crippled government revenue stream. 24 Local
communities suffering as a result of the surge in piracy have called for
government response, an option not available to their counterparts in
the East.
25
There is also speculation that piracy will move beyond its current
continental establishment into South America. 26 The Atlantic coast is
reportedly poised to become a trading route of comparable significance
to that of the Malacca Straits and the Gulf of Aden. 127 Both Colombia
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and Venezuela are major exporters of oil and gas, and Brazil, with an
ever-strengthening economy and recent discovery of offshore energy
reserves, is positioned to become a major player in the global export
market. 12' This means that a boom in the region's shipping industry
may be in the foreseeable future, and along with it, the threat of
maritime piracy. However, the government of Brazil is considerably
more functional than those of the African countries that are plagued by
piracy, and if the importance of this factor is realized, it may be enough
to successfully deter piracy in a similar manner to China and Japan in
the Malacca Straits. 
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CONCLUSION
The surge in maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia is in many
ways significant on a global scale, and the effects of this primarily
domestic industry will continue to challenge the international
community for some time. Though many have called for and taken
action, there still exists a clear ideological divide between members of
the international community, created by motivations that are best
defined as primary needs satisfaction within underdeveloped nations on
one side, and satisfaction of secondary interests in developed nations on
the other. This conflict creates a moral conundrum for those seeking
satisfaction of their basic needs, and begs the question of whether there
exists a manageable way to deter piracy through a viable alternative,
rather than simply using international force. What is also clear is that it
is the responsibility of the international community to develop a time-
sensitive plan of action, rather than framing this as simply a domestic
problem, or international industry stands to suffer at the hands of those
it has contemporarily exploited.
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